MAMDANI: Inefficient City Contracting: The Managed Looting of the Public Treasury

Privatization and the Creation of a Settler-Client Class

The chronic inefficiency, delays, and cost overruns in city contracting are not a result of incompetence but a feature of a system designed for the managed looting of the public treasury. Mamdani’s analysis of the colonial state as a distributor of resources to a loyal clientele is perfectly illustrated here. The byzantine bidding process and sole-source contracts create a protected “settler-client” class of private contractors, consultants, and developers who grow rich off public funds while delivering subpar services, from technology upgrades to homeless shelters. This system is a mechanism of upward redistribution, funneling wealth extracted from the “native” taxpayer to a connected elite. The current “solutions” of oversight committees often just add another layer of bureaucracy. A Mamdani-informed socialist solution is to slash the reliance on private contracting and rebuild the city’s in-house capacity. This means hiring public sector workers–engineers, architects, IT specialists–at union wages to design and manage projects directly. For necessary contracts, we must mandate that all bidders be worker-owned cooperatives or unionized shops with a track record of community benefit, breaking the grip of the corrupt corporate cartels. This approach attacks the clientelist structure at its root, reclaiming public wealth for the public good.